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Yoon-Ha Yoo*1
This paper analyzes the effects of evidentiary uncertainty on 
people's incentives to abide by rules in the context of negligence 
rules in tort law. It demonstrates that i) the comparative 
negligence rule is not necessarily superior to the simple or the 
contributory negligence rule, ii) an application of lenient standards 
of due care under the contributory negligence rule than in 
comparative negligence rule would not necessarily restore social 
efficiency, and iii) a partial reduction of legal uncertainty would 
not necessarily improve social efficiency. These results contrast 
previous theoretical literature.
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I. Introduction
It is well known in tort literature that under perfect information, 
all three negligence rules - simple, contributory, and comparative 
negligence - generate socially efficient levels of care both by the 
injurer and the victim. It is also well known that once uncertainty, 
caused either by measurement error or vagueness of a statute, is 
introduced into this ideal world of perfect information, the efficiency 
proposition breaks down. (Haddock and Curran 1985; Calfee and 
Craswell 1984; Craswell and Calfee 1986; Cooter and Ulen 1986; 
Shavell 1987). 
Since uncertainty is unavoidable in life, the following set of 
questions naturally arises:
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1) whether one negligence rule has efficiency advantage over the 
remaining two,
2) whether one can restore social efficiency by altering the legal 
standard of due care, and,
3) whether one can improve social efficiency by reducing the 
degree of uncertainty.
Regarding the first question, Haddock and Curran (1985) 
conjectured that the comparative-negligence rule might be better 
than the remaining two, and Cooter and Ulen (1986) developed this 
idea into a full-blown proposition that the comparative-negligence 
rule is superior to the other rules. 
As to the second question, Calfee and Craswell (1984) suggested 
that, in order to correct any incentives to overcomply or under-
comply induced by uncertainty, courts should make corresponding 
adjustments in legal standards or damages awarded. Following this 
line of thought, Edlin (1994) argued that the jury's tendency to be 
more lenient toward the plaintiff under the contributory than the 
comparative-negligence rule does in fact accomplishes the required 
adjustment, thereby playing an instrumental role in promoting 
efficiency. 
Concerning the third question, calls for reduced uncertainty are 
too pervasive to list－many legal arrangements such as the “bright- 
line principle,” the “void for vagueness” doctrine, the provision of a 
collegiate judgment system purport to improve the legal accuracy, 
despite the caveat (Craswell and Calfee 1986) that reduced 
uncertainty may backfire by inducing the injurer to take excessive 
precaution. 
This paper reexamines these three issues in a general 
game-theoretic setting, and shows that those earlier writers' 
conclusions may not always hold true. In particular, this paper 
demonstrates that: 
1) the comparative-negligence rule is not necessarily superior to 
the other rules, 
2) jury leniency does not always improve the social efficiency 
under the contributory-negligence rule, and
3) in general, it is impossible to improve social efficiency by 
merely reducing the degree of legal uncertainty.
The key driving force behind these conclusions is that both the 
direction and the size of the deviations from the social optimum 
induced by uncertainty in each negligence regime are generally 
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indeterminate. And the change in equilibrium care to be brought 
about by the suggested remedial measures is also indeterminate. 
Therefore, unless one imposes strong restrictions on the way people 
behave, it is not, in general, possible to 1) rank the different 
negligence rules by their efficiency properties, 2) make an 
adjustment in legal standards to the different negligence rules, nor 
3) reduce uncertainty in such a way that would guarantee an 
improvement of social efficiency across the board.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, a model is set 
up to derive equilibrium solutions under different negligence 
regimes. In this model, the potential injurer and victim are likened 
to players in a liability shifting game. The equilibrium arises as a 
non-cooperative solution to the game, and the social optimum as 
the cooperative solution. As usual, the non-cooperative solution 
diverges from the cooperative one, creating suboptimality. In section 
III, it is demonstrated that both the magnitude and the direction of 
deviation of the noncooperative solution from the cooperative 
optimum cannot be predicted in advance, because of the many 
intervening factors such as externalities that one party inflicts upon 
the other party, and strategic substitutability or complementarity 
between the two players' precaution. This implies that the efficiency 
loss induced by uncertainty is much harder to cure than is 
suggested by earlier writers. Section IV provides some graphical 
illustration. Section V compares the results with those of earlier 
literature. Section VI concludes.
II. The Model
 
Let x and y denote the care level taken by a potential injurer 
and a victim, respectively. Care taking is costly and the unit cost 
of care is represented by u and v. Greater care reduces the 
expected accident loss, A(x, y), Ai＜0, i＝{x, y}. A social planner 
wants to minimize the sum of the cost of care and the cost of 
expected accident loss,
Min J(x, y)＝ux＋vy＋A(x, y).  (1)
x, y
The first order conditions (FOC) are  
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Jx(x
*, y*)＝u＋Ax(x
*, y*)＝0,                   (2a)
Jy(x
*, y*)＝v＋Ay(x
*, y*)＝0,                   (2b)
meaning that the marginal cost of precaution must be equated with 
the marginal reduction of expected accident loss at equilibrium. Let 
the optimum solution be denoted as x
* and y*. For later reference, 
note that a negative Axy implies that the injurer's care and the 
victim's care are complements in reducing the expected accident 
loss, while a positive Axy implies that they are substitutes. 
A. Various Negligence Rules and Equilibrium Care under 
Evidentiary Uncertainty
In considering various negligence rules, I assume that the court 
sets the legal standard of due care at the socially efficient level, x* 
and y
*, and the damages at the level of actual loss. The party 
whose care level falls short of the legal standard will be deemed 
negligent or at fault. 
The damages are apportioned differently depending on which 
negligence rule is applied. Under the simple negligence rule, the 
injurer is liable if he is negligent.1 If the injurer is not negligent, 
the entire loss must be borne by the victim. Under the contributory 
negligence rule, the injurer is liable only when he is negligent and 
the victim is not negligent. Negligence on the part of the victim, no 
matter how minor, will result in a complete bar of damage 
compensation. The comparative negligence rule is identical to the 
contributory negligence rule except when both are negligent. In the 
latter case, the damages will be shared in some pre-stipulated 
manner. 
It is now well known that in an ideal world of complete 
information, all three negligence rules generate an efficient outcome 
in which both the injurer and the victim exercise care at the 
socially optimal level. So there is no apparent reason to choose one 
negligence rule over the others as long as efficiency is concerned. 
This equivalence among different rules of negligence, however, 
breaks down when uncertainty is brought into the picture. 
In order to see this, let's assume that x and y are observed with 
an error, e, which has a density function f(e) and a cumulative 
1
I will arbitrarily call the injurer “he” and the victim “she.”
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distribution function F(e). The party whose observed care level is 
less than the legal standard will now be deemed negligent. This 
implies that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can be certain 
whether or not the court will determine that their precautionary 
behavior was sufficient to absolve one of them of fault. We may call 
this condition “evidentiary uncertainty.”2 The probability that the 
injurer will be found negligent is 
prob (x＋e＜x
*)＝prob (e＜x*－x)＝F(x*－x).            (3)
The victim's probability of being held negligent is similarly defined. 
For distinction, let F(x
*－x) denote the probability of the injurer's 
being found negligent, and G(y
*－y), the probability of the victim's 
being found negligent. 
Each party's cost minimization problem under different negligence 
rules can now be summarized as follows.
1) Simple Negligence
    I
s＝ux＋A(x, y)F(x*－x)
    Vs＝vy＋A(x, y) [1－F(x*－x)]                                 
2) Contributory Negligence
    I
n＝ux＋A(x, y)F(x*－x)[1－G(y*－y)]                         
    Vn＝vy＋A(x, y) {1－F(x*－x)[1－G(y*－y)]}                     
3) Comparative Negligence
    I
m＝ux＋A(x, y)F(x*－x)[1－G(y*－y)r]                       
    Vm＝vy＋A(x, y) {1－F(x*－x)[1－G(y*－y)r]}                  
where the superscripts s, n, and m stand for the simple, 
contributory and comparative negligence rules, respectively. The 
parameter r represents the proportion of the damages that the 
victim has to bear when both parties are found to be negligent, 
0≤r≤1.3
2
Even though we are mainly concerned with measurement error problem 
in this paper, the arguments developed below will be equally applicable to 
the case where parties have uncertainty about the standards of care applied 
by courts, or courts make mistakes in applying the standards.
3
Different versions of the comparative negligence rule have different 
damage-sharing rules. For example, the traditional version of the US 
maritime rule has the damages to be split equally when both the plaintiff 
and the defendant are found negligent. In this case, r＝0.5 and is fixed. 
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Note first that all the objective functions under each negligence 
rule can be obtained by assigning different values to r : If r＝0, it 
will give rise to the simple negligence rule; if r＝1, the contributory 
negligence rule; if 0＜r＜1, the comparative negligence rule. Thus, 
we can use the comparative negligence rule as an all-encompassing 
representative model, and generalize the result by alternating the 
value of r. Rewrite the objective functions as4
             I＝ux＋A(x, y)F(x*－x)φ(y, r)                       (4a)
             V＝vy＋A(x, y) [1－F(x
*－x)φ(y, r)]                  (4b)
where φ(y, r)＝1－G(y*－y)r, 0≤r≤1. Here, we have φ＝1, φy＝0 
under the simple negligence rule and φ＝1－G, φy＝g under the 
contributory negligence rule. Given these, Fφ now stands for the 
probability that the injurer is held liable, weighted by the sharing 
parameter r, and 1－Fφ the probability that the victim is held 
liable. 
Second, note that J≡I
k＋Vk for all k＝{s, n, m}. Under any 
negligence rule, the social planner's objective function is simply the 
sum of the injurer's and the victim's objective functions. This is so 
because either injurer or victim must bear the loss once an 
accident occurs with no third party being affected. Therefore, we 
can presume that the social planner tries to minimize the joint 
cost, whereas the injurer and the victim each try to minimize 
his/her own individual cost, with no regard to the other party's 
cost. (For mnemonics, J stands for joint, and I and V for injurer 
and victim, respectively.)
The FOCs for the noncooperative solution are
                Ix (x
k, yk)＝u＋AxFφ－Afφ＝0                     (5a)
Vy (x
k, yk)＝v＋Ay(1－Fφ)－AFφy＝0.              (5b)
The marginal cost of precaution is again equated with the marginal 
savings of expected liability. Unlike the cooperative solution, 
More commonly, however, sharing rules divide the liability in proportion to 
fault, making r a function of x and y. Nonetheless, for simplicity of 
analysis, I consider only the case with fixed r. In the Appendix, I provide a 
brief extension to the case of variable r.
4 Since functions in (4) subsume all three different negligence rules, the 
superscripts, s, n, m are spared. 
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however, the marginal savings here are composed of two terms (the 
second and the third term), with the second term capturing the 
accident loss curtailed by the increased precaution, and the third 
term, the liability passed onto the other party. In the non-
cooperative game, whenever one player increases his/her level of 
precaution, it always generates these two mutually reinforcing 
effects. In the following, I will call the former as the loss curtailing 
(LC) effect of one party's precaution and the latter as the liability 
shifting (LS) effect.
Equations (5a) and (5b) are the reaction functions of the injurer 
and the victim, respectively. The Nash equilibrium is obtained by 
solving these two reaction functions simultaneously. Let this 
noncooperative solution be denoted as (x
k, yk), k＝{s, m, n}. 
III. Properties of Equilibrium
In this section, I present some of properties of equilibrium under 
evidentiary uncertainty. 
Proposition 1
In every negligence rule, the level of care taken by each party 
under the evidentiary uncertainty is sub-optimal, i.e., x
k≠x* and 
y
k≠y*, k＝{s, m, n}.
Proof: Using the identity J≡I＋V, rewrite the FOCs for the 








*＝0,                      (6b)
where * attached to each expression implies that the function is 
evaluated at the social optimum point, (x
*, y*). Equations (6) say 
that in order to reach the social optimum, each party must 
consider not only the effect of one's precaution on his/her own cost 
but also on the other party's cost as well. The FOCs for the 
non-cooperative solutions in (5), however, consider one's own cost 
only, thus failing to take into account the effect that one's 
precaution might have on the other party's cost. Therefore, unless 




＝0), the equilibrium levels 
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of care under evidentiary uncertainty, (xk, yk), necessarily deviate 
from (x*, y*). 
Below, it will be shown that neither Vx
* nor Iy
* can be zero unless 
each player's LC effect of precaution exactly cancels out the LS 
effect, which is rather unlikely.
Now let's investigate the possible directions of the deviation from 
the social optimum. In particular, we are interested in examining 
whether overcompliance or undercompliance will take place as a 
result of evidentiary uncertainty. This is interesting because some 
researchers claim that there would be a general tendency that 
evidentiary uncertainty induces parties to overcomply (Cooter and 
Ulen 1986; Shavell 2003). 
Taking a Taylor series expansion around (x
*, y*) and evaluating at 





＋Ixy’ (yk－y*)＝－Vx*＋Ixy’ (yk－y*)          (7a)
Vy(x
k, y*)＝Vy
*＋Vyx’ (xk－x*)＝－Iy*＋Vyx’ (xk－x*),        (7b)
where Iij’＝Iij(x ’,y’), Vij’＝Vij(x ’,y’) and x ’＝αxk＋(1－α)x*, y’＝αyk＋
(1－α )y*, 0＜α＜1. The second equalities are obtained using (6). 
Here, a positive Ix(x
*, yk) implies the injurer's undercompliance, and 
a negative Ix(x
*, yk) overcompliance. The same relationship holds 
with regard to the victim's precaution.
Note that in each equation of (7), the right hand side of the first 
equality has two terms: The first term representing the deviation 
from the optimum at the socially optimal point, Ix
* and Vy
*, and the 
second term representing one party's reaction to the other party's 
deviation from the optimum. I will call the first term the pure 
uncertainty effect, and the second term the feedback effect. By 
inspecting the terms following the second equalities, we can see 
that the pure uncertainty effect is none other than the negative of 
the externality effects mentioned above. And the feedback effect is 
determined by the signs of the cross derivatives, Ixy  and Vyx, or 
equivalently by whether x and y are viewed as strategic substitutes 
or complements.5 If the injurer regards the victim's precaution as 
substitute, he will adjust his level of precaution to the opposite 
5 For the definition of strategic complements and substitutes, see Bulow 
et al. (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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direction of the victim's, and if he regards it as complement, to the 
same direction. 
In the following, I will first examine the pure uncertainty effect 
and then the feedback effect, and show that 1) the pure 
uncertainty effect is composed of two opposing externality effects, 
the positive LC effect and the negative LS effect,6 and the net effect 
is indeterminate, 2) the feedback effect is determined again by the 
interaction of two players' LC and LS effect, which generates four 
interaction terms, (LC by LC, LC by LS, LS by LC, and LS by LS), 
and is indeterminate. 
A. The Pure Uncertainty Effect
Differentiating one party's objective function with respect to the 














In each equation, the first term on the right hand side of the 
first equality is the LC effect and is negative; by increasing his/her 
precaution, each party reduces the accident loss itself, thus 
lowering the burden that the other party would bear (positive 
externality). The second term is positive and represents the LS 
effect; one party's incremental precaution increases the cost to the 
other party by raising the other party's probability of being held 
liable7 (negative externality). 
In short, whenever one party increases his/her precaution, it 
slices off the accident loss, which is beneficial for both. At the 
same time, however, it also has the effect of passing the liability to 
the other party, which is good for oneself but bad for the other 
6
As we will see later, the LC effect is numerically negative. Nonetheless I 
call it positive externality effect because one party's precaution helps the 
other party by reducing the cost that the other party has to bear.
7 Or equivalently, by increasing the caretaker's probability of being 
exonerated. 
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party. The net of these two opposing forces then determines the 
overall effect of the pure uncertainty. This concurs with the general 
economic principle that the net negative externalities entail 
excessive activity, and the positive externalities insufficient activity.
Since there is no way of knowing a priori whether there will be 
net positive externalities or negative externalities, it is obvious that 
the pure uncertainty effect is indeterminate. However, we can figure 
out a few important factors that affect the direction of externality. 




＝－v at the social 
optimum point. Replacing each and rewriting, we obtain the second 
equality in (8).  
The first term in each bracket on the right hand side of the 
second equality represents the marginal gain that one party can 
enjoy by passing the liability to the other party and the second 
term the unit cost of care. Therefore the expressions show that one 
would overcomply if the liability shifting gain is greater than 
his/her unit cost of care, and undercomply if the gain is smaller 
than the unit cost. Examining each component of the terms, we 
can see also that;
1) Other things being equal, the cheaper one's unit cost of 
precaution is, one would more overcomply.
2) The larger A
*, the size of the accident loss at the optimum 
point or socially unavoidable accident loss, is, more likely is 
one to overcomply.8 Obviously this is because the stake is 
high.
3) Assuming the error distribution is symmetric and uni-modal, 
the smaller the variance of the distribution is and therefore the 
larger the value of f(0) or g(0)9 is, one would more overcomply. 
If one can change one's fate significantly by undertaking a 
small additional care, one would surely take that extra care.
Summarizing what has been stated so far, we can establish the 
following proposition.
Proposition 2
The pure uncertainty effect depends on the relative size of the 
8
This implies that if the causation rule is strictly imposed and therefore 
the compensation damage is limited only to the excess of accident loss over 
the unavoidable, both injurer and victim would unvaryingly undercomply. 
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positive LC externality and the negative LS externality and the 
overall direction of the effect is in general indeterminate. One is 
more likely to overcomply, the cheaper the cost of care is, the 
bigger the stake one can pass onto the other party is, and the 
easier one can alter the probability of being exonerated from the 
liability.
An exception to this general indeterminacy is the case of the 
victim under the simple negligence rule. In this case, the victim 
does not have the leverage to exercise her LS effect (φy＝0) because 
her level of care does not matter under the simple negligence rule. 
Constrained to create only the beneficial LC effect, the victim is 
likely to take inadequate amount of care unless the feedback effect 
more than offset the pure uncertainty effect.
B. The Feedback Effects
By differentiating the FOCs in (5) with respect to the other 
party's precaution, we have
Ixy＝AxyFφ＋AxFφy－Ay fφ－Afφy                     (9a)
Vyx＝Ayx(1－Fφ)＋Ay fφ－AxFφy＋Afφy.                (9b)
A few things are worthy of note: First, every term except the first 
in Ixy is identical to the corresponding term in Vyx in magnitude, 
but opposite in sign. This is again because of the zero-sum nature 
of the game: Every additional gain enjoyed by the injurer by 
passing the buck becomes an additional burden to the victim, and 
vice versa. 
Second, when we put aside these LS related terms, the sign of Ixy 
and Vyx is solely determined by the sign of Axy, the technical 
complementarity or substitutability between x and y. This implies 
that any divergence between the technical and strategic comple-
mentarity is due to the LS effect. 
Third, we have Ixy＋Vxy＝Axy in every negligence regime. As the LS 
effects are being completely netted out and the LC effects are being 
probabilistically divided between the two, we are left only with Axy 
when we add them together. One immediate implication is that Ixy 
and Vxy are asymmetrical unlike the cooperative solution. In 
particular, Aij＝0 no longer guarantees the mutual independence 
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TABLE 1
THE SIGNS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL TERM
LC by LC LC by LS LS by LC LS by LS
Ixy ? － ＋ －
Vyx ? － ＋ ＋
between the injurer's precaution and the victim's precaution. 
Rather, Axy＝0 dictates Ixy＝－Vyx implying that if one party 
considers x and y as strategic complements, the other party should 
necessarily consider them substitutes. 
If we examine the signs of each individual term, it can be 
summarized as those given in Table 1.
The first term of each equation represents the LC by LC effect 
and is indeterminate; it depends on the sign of Axy, the technical 
substitutability or complementarity of each party's precaution. The 
second term (the LC by LS effect) is negative; each party's LC effect 
is strengthened by the other party's precaution because the other 
party's increased precaution raises the probability of one's liability, 
the probability that one will enjoy the loss diminution one has 
created. This makes each other's precaution strategically comple-
mentary. The third term is positive; the accident loss size has been 
made smaller by the other party's greater precaution and therefore 
shifting it onto the other party does not bestow that much benefit 
to the shifter.  
Unlike the first three terms, the sign of the fourth term diverges; 
it is negative to the injurer, but positive to the victim. This 
disparate response to the other party's precaution has its roots in 
the fundamental asymmetry between the injurer and the victim; the 
injurer can pass the burden only when the victim is non-negligent 
whereas the victim can pass the buck only when the injurer is 
negligent. In other words, the victim's care increases 1－G (by 
decreasing G) and therefore magnifies the injurer's LS effect which 
works through F term in F(1－G). From the viewpoint of the victim, 
however, the injurer's additional care reduces F and consequently 
shrinks F(1－G) through which (1－G) term can work. This built-in 
asymmetry makes injurer view the victim's care as strategic 
complements, but makes the victim consider the injurer's care as 
strategic substitutes.
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Turning to the question of different negligence regime, the victim 
has no power to shift the liability (φ＝1 and φy＝0) under the 
simple negligence rule, but only to cut it small. This leaves only 
the first and the third term in (9a) and the first and second term 
in (9b). The Axy term is common to both Ixy and Vyx. The remaining 
term is Ay f, which concerns the interaction between the injurer's 
LS effect and the victim's LC effect. This effect is positive to the 
injurer, but negative to the victim. This implies that, under the 
simple negligence regime, it is more likely for the injurer to 
consider the victim's care as a substitute for his care (a downward 
sloping reaction curve), and for the victim to view the injurer's care 
as a complement to her care (an upward sloping reaction curve).10 
This is definitely so when Axy＝0.
As the negligence regime tilts toward the contributory negligence 
rule, the strategic position taken by either party gradually switches 
toward the opposite direction, with the injurer's position heading 
from strategic substitutes toward complements, and the victim's 
from strategic complements toward the substitutes. As explained 
earlier, this comes from the fact that the victim's LS effect tends to 
work as complements to the injurer and the injurer's LS effect 
works as substitutes to the victim.
Summarizing we have, 
Proposition 3
The feedback effect depends one whether one party's care works 
as strategic complements or substitutes to the other party's care, 
which in turn hinges on 1) the technical substitutability between 
the two, and 2) which negligence rule is in force. Assuming 
technical independence (Axy＝0), the injurer views the victim's care 
as strategic substitutes under the simple negligence rule but tends 
to view more as strategic complements under the contributory 
negligence rule. The opposite is true with the victim; she views the 
injurer's care as complements under the simple negligence rule but 
tends to view more as substitutes under the contributory negligence 
rule.
10 Putting aside the first term, which reflects the LC effects of each 
party's care. 
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C. The Total Effect
Rearranging and solving (7) simultaneously gives,









V ’yy－Iy* I ’xy
,  yk－y*＝
I ’xx Iy*－V ’yxVx*
 (10)
|H| |H|
where |H| is the determinant of the coefficient matrix. Assuming 





＝0, xk－x*＝yk－y*＝0. This implies that the ultimate source 
of the deviations from the optimum is the pure uncertainty effect. If 
the pure uncertainty effects become non-zero, then the feedback 
effects start to propagate the initial deviations to each player. 
To see how this system works, let's consider a simplest possible 
case; the simple negligence rule with Axy＝0. Under the simple 
negligence rule, the victim has no leverage to pass the liability and 
therefore exerts only positive externality to the injurer, Iy
*＜0. 
Furthermore, the assumption of Axy＝0 assures us that Ixy＞0 and 
Vyx＜0. 
Under this hypothetical situation, the only unknown free term is 
Vx
*. Suppose it is positive. Then, according to equation (10), the 
injurer's equilibrium care will surely be excessive, but the victim's 
care is indeterminate. Alternatively, if Vx
* is negative, the victim's 
care will be definitely deficient, but injurer's care is indeterminate. 
The latter case is especially interesting because initially at the 
social optimum point, both the injurer and victim have incentives 
to undercomply but the victim only maintains the deficiency to the 
end. The injurer's initial undercompliance may end up with 
overcompliance because he sees the victim's care as strategic 
substitute and therefore react inversely to the victim's 
undercompliance. 
11
This condition is very much likely to be satisfied because 1) Ixx and Vyy 
are positive from the SOC, and 2) Ixy and Vyx tend to have the opposite 
sign.
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IV. Graphical Illustration
In this section, I provide a few graphical illustrations to check 
some of the results obtained thus far. I assume that A(x, y)＝
A ̅－4x－4y, and a uniform distribution with the support [－e, e] 
and that the cost of care function is given by x
2 and y2, 
respectively.12 This implies that Axy＝0 and F(x
*－x)＝(x*－x)/2e＋1/2. 
In particular, I first set A̅＝20, e＝1/2 and then allow small 
changes in A̅ and e later. Apparently these assumptions are highly 
restrictive. But it still provides us with a few interesting 
implications. Trivially, the social optimum solution is attained at 
x
*＝y*＝2. 
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium outcomes under various 
negligence rules, the simple negligence (r＝0), the comparative 
negligence (r＝.2 and .6), and the contributory negligence rule 
(r＝1). In each panel, the solid curve (R1) represents the injurer's 
reaction curve, while the dashed one (R2) represents the victim's. 
The horizontal axis measures the level of the injurer's care, and the 
vertical axis, the victim's care. The equilibrium values of care, 
which are found at the cross of the two reaction curves, are given 
in the first row of Table 2. 
Under the simple negligence rule with Axy＝0, the injurer has a 
negative-sloped reaction curve, and the victim a positive-sloped 
reaction curve as explained earlier. At the intersection of R1 and R2, 
the equilibrium (xs, ys) occurs at (2.33, 1.67), that is, xs＞x* and 
y
s＜y*, implying that the injurer overcomplies and the victim 
undercomplies.
As the value of r increases, the slope of R1 gets steeper and 
finally turns into a positive value at the equilibrium point under 
the contributory rule. On the other hand, the slope of R2, which 
used to be positive, becomes negative. This confirms the predicted 
switch of each party's strategic position.
At the same time, the injurer's reaction curve shifts in, and the 
victim's curve shifts up as the value of r increases. These shifts are 
clearly shown in Figure 2, which combines all four panels. There, 
the shifts and the simultaneous changes in slope make the 
12
This example is from Edlin (1994). Being non-linear, the cost of care 
function here is slightly different from the one given in section II. Nothing 
substantive is changed, though. 
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FIGURE 1
EQUILIBRIUM CARE UNDER DIFFERENT NEGLIGENCE RULES
TABLE 2
EQUILIBRIUM CARE LEVELS UNDER DIFFERENT VALUES OF A ̅












































injurer's and the victim's reaction curves rotate clockwise. The 
shifts create a general tendency that the care level taken by the 
injurer decreases, from 2.33 to 2.24, 2.02, and finally to 1.95, and 
the care level taken by the victim increases, from 1.67 to 1.68, 
1.95 and finally to 2.19, as the value of r increases. However, this 
general tendency is, sometimes obtruded by the concomitant slope 
changes. For example, the victim's care decreases from 1.88 to 1.86 
a. Simple Negligence (r＝0) b. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.2)
c. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.6) d. Contributory Negligence (r＝1)
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FIGURE 2
THE SHIFTS AND SLOPE CHANGES OF THE REACTION CURVES
as the value of r increases from 0 to 0.2 under A ̅＝22 (see Table 
2). In fact, the equilibrium path always contains an initial segment 
that declines southwestward before it climbs northwestward. 
Figure 3 shows the effect of an increase in A ̅, from 20 to 22. It 
makes the injurer's reaction function shift outward and the victim's 
reaction curve shift upward, except for the victim's reaction curve 
under the simple negligence rule. It also makes the reaction curves 
rotate clockwise again. 
Under the simple negligence rule, the victim's reaction curve 
stays put, but the injurer's reaction curve shifts out. This makes 
both the injurer's and the victim's care levels to increase from 
(2.33, 1.67) to (2.44, 1.89). This implies that if A̅ is sufficiently 
large, both the injurer and the victim will overcomply. Similarly, a 
sufficiently small A̅ would make both undercomply. This simple 
relationship between the equilibrium points and changes in A ̅ does 
not, however, extend to the case of other negligence rules under 
which the victim's reaction curve also shifts. For example, the 
victim's care under the contributory negligence rule declines from 
2.25 to 2.23 as A ̅ increases from 22 to 24 (Table 2). 
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FIGURE 3
THE EFFECT OF A ̅ CHANGES ON EQUILIBRIUM CARE
TABLE 3
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE MARGIN OF MEASUREMENT ERROR












































Figures 4 and 5 below show the effects of altering the margin of 
measurement error, first from e＝0.5 to 1.0, and then from 0.3 to 
0.5. The reactions differ depending on the initial level of un-
certainty.
When the margin of error increases from 0.5 to 1.0, both the 
injurer's and the victim's equilibrium care decrease in every 
negligence regime, as shown by the arrows all pointing southwest. 
This is the result predicted initially by Craswell and Calfee (1986), 
a. Simple Negligence (r＝0) b. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.2)
c. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.6) d. Contributory Negligence (r＝1)
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FIGURE 4
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED MARGIN OF MEASUREMENT ERROR (I)
and analyzed more formally later by Yoo (2004), who named them 
as “discounting effects.” When the initial variance of legal uncer- 
tainty is relatively large, people tend to become lax and conse- 
quently take less care as variance further increases. 
When the initial variance is relatively small, however, people may 
react by increasing their precaution in response to an increase in 
uncertainty; some people who have already secured a high-enough 
probability of getting exonerated by taking a sufficiently large 
amount of care may try to guard their expected good fortunes by 
expensing more care as the randomness increases. Their incentives 
are like those who purchase insurance against a small chance of 
bad outcome (thus termed the “insurance effect” in Yoo (2004)).13 
13
People who initially exerted a relatively low level of care, and are thus 
facing a high probability of bad outcome, may also increase their care levels 
in response to the increased variance in the hope that the increased 
a. Simple Negligence (r＝0) b. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.2)
c. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.6) d. Contributory Negligence (r＝1)
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FIGURE 5
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED MARGIN OF MEASUREMENT ERROR (II)
This is what happens to the injurer under the simple negligence 
rule (southeast movement) and the victim under the contributory 
rule (northwest movement) in Figure 5. In response to the 
increased margin of error, from 0.3 to 0.5, the injurer under the 
simple negligence rule increases his care level from 2.30 to 2.33 
(insurance effect), whereas the victim decreases her care level from 
2.01 to 1.67 (discounting effect). Under the contributory negligence 
regime (r＝1), the injurer decreases his care level from 2.15 to 1.95, 
but the victim increases her care level from 2.17 to 2.19 as the 
variance increases.
randomness may bring them a luck by chance. They “gamble” in the face of 
increased risk. This “gambling” behavior, which can occur under a normal 
distribution, however, does not arise here because the assumed distribution 
is uniform. See Yoo (2004). 
a. Simple Negligence (r＝0) b. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.2)
c. Comparative Negligence (r＝0.6) d. Contributory Negligence (r＝1)
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V. Comparison with Earlier Literature
A. Non-Superiority of the Comparative Negligence Rule14
The proposition that the comparative negligence rule is superior 
to the other two rules (Cooter and Ulen 1986) is founded on the 
following three building blocks: i) Under evidentiary uncertainty, 
both parties are induced to overcomply in every negligence rule, ii) 
the magnitude of overcompliance, however, can be ranked among 
the three different negligence rules in such a way that x
n＜xm＜xs 
and y
s＜ym＜yn, and iii) assuming that both injurer and victim are 
symmetrically situated, the comparative negligence rule is superior 
to the other two because it entails the smallest sum of deviations 
from the optimum. Below, it is shown that the first two of these 
claims are not necessarily true and the third building block is not 
the proper criterion for the social efficiency.
First, we have already seen that the first building block is not 
true. Depending on the unit cost of care, the size of the expected 
accident loss, the variance of measurement error distribution, and 
the direction of technical and strategic complementarity, people may 
as well undercomply as overcomply.
Second, there exists no clear-cut ranking among (xk, yk), k＝{s, n, m} 
as is shown in Table 3. It is true that as r increases, there is a 
general tendency for the injurer's care to decrease and the victim's 
care to increase. This is because the injurer's reaction curve shifts 
in, and the victim's reaction curve shifts up as the value of r 
increases. Yet the concurrent change in slope of the reaction curves 
disturbs this monotonic relationship between the care levels and 
negligence regime, and thereby makes the final results ambiguous. 











[ Ixx (Ag－AyG)F－Vyx (AxF－Af )G ].  (11b)
∂r |H|
14
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003) makes similar argument. But they 
show the non-superiority through a numerical simulation, not by algebraic 
proof as is done in the present paper.
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As expected, we cannot pin down the sign of the expressions 
because of the indeterminacy of Ixy and Vyx. What is interesting in 
this context is that if we set Ixy＝Vyx＝0 and thereby turn off the 
feedback effect, Equations (11) yield the claimed ranking.15 
Lastly, and trivially, what is important for the social efficiency is 
the sum of the costs not the sum of the care deviations. Therefore 
one cannot rank the relative efficiency among various negligence 
rules simply based on the sum of deviations. To see this, denote J
* 
the minimized social cost at the optimum, and J the social cost at 
any other arbitrary levels of care. Then we have 
 J－J
* ＝X’HX.                        (12)
where X＝{x－x
*, y－y*}’. This is positive definite by definition and 
the contour map of this function represents an ellipse centered at 
the origin. The direct implication is that there is no way of 
ascertaining the superiority or inferiority of any negligence rule 
simply by looking at the sum of the deviations. For example, point 
A in Figure 6 has a larger sum of deviations, but a smaller social 
cost than the point B. Therefore, point A is superior to point B 
from a social efficiency point of view.
B. Curing the Efficiency Loss by Changing the Legal Standards 
of Due Care
It is clear from the above discussion that changing the legal 
standards of care would yield ambiguous results in the equilibrium 
care levels. Worse, one does not even know whether there will be 
under- or over-compliance from the beginning. 
The solution to this impasse, suggested by Edlin (1994), is, 
basically to reset the legal standards such that Vx
*＝Iy
*＝0 is assured 
in (8). It attempts to stamp out the externality at its source. Once 
the externality elements are expunged, one needs not worry about 
the unknown feedback effect. Furthermore, it appears that the 
goals are theoretically attainable because we have two equations 
15 In fact, when examining whether one party has incentives to over- or 
undercomply, Haddock and Curan (1985), Cooter and Ulen (1986) assumed 
that the other party will stick to the socially optimal level of care. By 
forcing the other party's deviation in (7) to vanish, however, they effectively 
rendered the sign and magnitude of the Ixy and Vyz terms irrelevant.
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SUM OF DEVIATIONS AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY
and two control parameters. Therefore, problems with the Edlin's 
proposal, if any, lie not in theoretical possibility but in practical 
applicability.  
Imposition of the no-net-externality constraint on (8) transforms it 
into a rather complicated simultaneous equation system in two 
legal standards, x̅ and y̅, the solution to which may or may not 
exist. Edlin assumes a uniform distribution with e＝1/2 and 
proposes a set of adjusted legal standard of due care as follows: 
When r＝1, set ( x̅, y̅ )＝(1.5, 1.5), and when r＝6/10, ( x̅, y̅ )＝(13/6, 
13/6).  Indeed, this new set of adjusted legal standards generates 
the desired social optimum. Based on this result, he interpreted 
that x̅ and y̅ are decreasing in r, that is, in the contributory 
negligence regime, the court has to impose a more lenient standard 
on both the injurer and the victim than in the comparative 
negligence regime. 
One crucial problem with the Edlin's proposal is that it cannot 










dr (Af ’－Ax f )(Ag’－Ayg)φ dr (Ag’－Ayg)r
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the signs of which cannot be determined because of the g’ and f ’ 
terms, the curvature of the distribution function. Edlin gets around 
this problem by assuming a uniform distribution under which 
g’＝f ’＝0.16
C. Non-Curability of Efficiency Loss by Improving the Legal 
Accuracy
As has been already suggested, it is in general impossible to 
correct the situation by partially reducing the measurement error or 
improving the legal accuracy. A reduced variance of the error 
distribution, being just another parameter subsumed in the model, 
will always generate ambiguous outcome because of the in-
determinacy of the expected externality effects and the feedback 
effects.  
As a matter of fact, there is one further complication that the 
authority has to face even in the case where only one party is 
involved. As is shown in Yoo (2004), a reduction in the variance of 
the error distribution may generate three different reactions - 
gambling, insurance as well as discount effects - depending on the 
initial size of the measurement error and the size of the damage to 
be awarded. These diverse responses to the improved accuracy in 
legal processes arise even under unilateral care, where strategic 
buck-passing incentives do not exist. 
VI. Conclusion
Uncertainty, which is pervasive in every legal arena, inevitably 
creates social inefficiency. A vague legal statute may make some 
people overly chilled, causing excessive precaution. Uncertain 
punishment of crimes may induce some to engage in more crimes, 
16
Another problem, though not as critical as the first one, is that, even 
with the assumption of uniform distribution, the results tend to be very 
sensitive to the size of margin of error and easily set the adjusted standard 
well outside of the possible support of the distribution. In fact, this is what 
happens with the Edlin's numerical example. The adjusted set of the 
standard he proposed for the contributory negligence rule, ( x ̅, y ̅ )＝(1.5, 1.5), 
is in fact equally effective for the comparative negligence rule as well. There 
is no need to provide a different set of (13/6, 13/6) for r＝6/10 because for 
any value x ̅≤1.5, F is always zero in his example, and given F＝0, y̅ 
should always equal 1.5, independent of the value of r. 
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and others in defensive or protective activities. 
In this paper, the effects of evidentiary uncertainty on social 
efficiency, and the probable effects of some of the suggested 
remedial measures, have been analyzed in the context of negligence 
rule in tort law. 
Conclusions are largely dismal: No simple cure appears to exist 
to deal with the efficiency loss caused by the legal uncertainty. The 
comparative negligence rule, which has been hailed by some as 
deus ex machina to the evidentiary uncertainty problem, does not 
appear to be capable of solving the problem. Adjustment of legal 
standards of due care may not work, either, unless the 
measurement error distribution has a particular shape and 
deviations from the social optimum fall within a particular range. 
Still worse, a partial reduction of uncertainty through a decrease in 
the variance of the measurement error is not likely to be helpful 
because there still remains the possibility to make the situation 
worse. Reduced uncertainty creates divergent incentives for each 
party, via its discounting, gambling, and insurance effects 
depending on the initial degree of uncertainty. 
A word on the assumption of the fixed r is in order. Apparently 
this assumption is highly restrictive and may seem to some to be 
unwarranted. Fortunately, however, this assumption is not as 
strong as it may at first appear because relaxation of it only 
strengthens the conclusion of the paper; the indeterminacy of the 
size and direction of the deviations from the social optimum. A 
detailed explanation is given in the Appendix. Here we provide only 
the summary of it. Firstly, if we let the damage sharing rule be a 
function of x and y, ρ(x*－x－ex, y*－y－ey), rendering it a random 
variable, and its expected value as r(x*－x, y*－y), we can prove that 
ry is negative but rx is indeterminate even with the assumption of 
ρx＞0 and ρy＜0. In short, by allowing the sharing rule to be a 
variable, we introduce an additional element of indeterminacy into 
the model. 
Secondly, once we assume that ry＜0 and rx＞0 despite the 
aforementioned indeterminacy, every argument given earlier applies 
straightforwardly, except that we have one more element that works 
in a similar way as the LS effect, i.e., one party's increased care 
shrinks the share of damages he/she has to bear when deemed 
negligent. We may call it the share reducing (SR) effect of one's 
care. In fact, the way how this SR effect works is so similar to the 
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LS effect, one may subsume it as a subset of the LS effect. All in 
all, the assumption of the fixed share is very much innocuous as 
far as the main conclusion of the paper is concerned.  
(Received 25 July 2005; Revised 3 January 2007)
Appendix
Let ρ(x*－x－ex, y*－y－ey) be the proportion of the accident loss 
that the victim bears under the comparative negligence rule. Since 
this formula is applicable only when both the injurer and the 






ρ (0, y*－y－ey)＝1, ρ (x*－x－ex, 0)＝0. It is reasonable to assume that 
ρx＞0 and ρy＜0.  Let the expected value of ρ (x*－x－ex, y*－y－ey) 
be denoted as r (x
*－x, y*－y). Taking expectation over the relevant 






ρ (x*－x－ex, y*－y－ey) f(ex) g(ey)dexdey.






ρy (x*－x－ex, y*－y－ey) f(ex) g(ey)dexdey
                 －∫-∞
x*-x
ρ (x*－x－ex, 0)f(ex) g(y*－y)dex
where the first term is negative and the second term drops out. 






ρx (x*－x－ex, y*－y－ey)f(ex) g(ey)dexdey
                 －∫-∞
y*-y
ρ (0, y*－y－ey)f(x*－x)g(ey)dey





                 －f (x*－x)G(y*－y)
where the first term is positive and the second term is negative.
Reinterpreting r (x*－x, y*－y) as the expected share, the FOC in 
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(5) can be rewritten
Ix (x
k, yk)＝u＋AxFφ－Afφ－AFGrx＝0                   (5a)’
Vy (x
k, yk)＝v＋Ay(1－Fφ)－AFφy＋AFGry＝ 0.           (5b)’
The second term represents the LC effect, the third term the LS 
effect, and the fourth term can be called as the share reducing 
(SR) effect of one party's care. The externality effect one party 










F*φ*＋A*F*φy*－A*F*G*ry*.                   (8b)’
The first term is negative, but the second and the third terms are 
positive. The feedback effect is given as
       Ixy＝AxyFφ＋AxFφy－AxFGry－Ay fφ－Afφy＋AfGry－AyFGrx
＋AFgrx－AFGrxy                                       (9a)’
      Vyx＝Ayx(1－Fφ)＋Ay fφ＋AyFGrx－AxFφy＋Afφy－AFgrx 
＋AxFGry－AfGry＋AFGryx                               (9b)’
Since the LC, LS, and SR effects interact among themselves, there 
are now nine terms in each equation. 
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